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EXPECTATIONS OF IMMUNITY:
REMOVING THE BARRIER TO
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT TO
PRE-1952 EVENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, anti-Semitic violence
continued in Poland. As Polish Jews returned home, they arrived
to find Poland "in a state of chaos and ruin."' Much of their
property had been adversely possessed, appropriated, or
confiscated by the Polish government and tensions over that
2property sparked a renewal of violence against the Jews. During
the first two years after the war, more than 1,000 Jews were
murdered, beaten, or abused.3
Theo Garb, one of the few surviving Polish Jews, encountered
these simmering tensions after returning home.4 Like so many
others returning home after the War, he was prevented from
reclaiming his property after World War II under the Polish post-
war nationalization laws.' Mr. Garb believed these laws "were
established to legitimize the taking of [Jewish] property., 6 In an
attempt to reclaim this property, Mr. Garb and other Jewish
1. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 17-18.
4. See id.
5. Id at 18. The 1946-47 nationalization laws provided that "'deserted property'-
real property that was confiscated by the Nazis or that was the subject of forced sales- was
to be returned to its owners or their legal successors . . . . Conversely, property
characterized as abandoned- once belonging to the Third Reich or German citizens-
became the property of the Treasury." Many Jews believed that the true owners of much
of the "abandoned property" were Jews. Id.
6. See id.
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Holocaust victims and their heirs brought suit against the Republic
of Poland in United States District Court in 2002.'
Their suit, Garb v. Republic of Poland, alleged that
"defendants violated customary international law by creating,
participating in, and/or failing to prevent the permanent
dispossession of Polish Jews' property in the aftermath of the
Holocaust and that defendants then , rofited commercially from
their management of the properties." Plaintiffs demanded that
the defendants turn over the income and profits of the property
and sought restitution from the Polish government.9
Despite their attempt to hold Poland accountable for
expropriation of their property, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), '°
which the court considers the sole basis for jurisdiction over a
foreign state." Under the FSIA, a foreign state is presumptively
immune from jurisdiction in respect to claims arising out of
governmental activities (de jure imperii); it is not immune from
claims arising out of activities of a kind carried on by private
persons (de jure gestionis)2 unless a specified exception applies. 3
An exception cannot be applied retroactively where it alters law or
7. See id. at 19.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1330, 1602-1.1 (Law. Co-op.
2002) (grants the district courts "original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state ... as to any claim for relief
in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either
under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement").
11. Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989)); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480. 493 (1983) ("[The FSIA] must be applied by the district courts in
every action against a foreign sovereign, since subject-matter jurisdiction in any such
action depends on the existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity....").
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 451 cmt. a (1987).
13. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1604 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (entitles foreign states to immunity from
the jurisdiction of federal and state courts "except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of
this chapter" and "subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act"); 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605 (Law. Co-op. 2002)
(general exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state include explicit or
implicit waiver; commercial activity; property taken in violation of international law; rights
in property by succession or gift or right is in the U.S.; money damages for personal injury
or death; or damages to loss of property noncommercial tort); see Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2d at
20 (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355, 123 (1993)).
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an expectation of immunity that existed before the enactment of
the statute in 1976.14 In Garb, the operative events leading to the
expropriation of property occurred during a period in which the
defendants claim to enjoy immunity from suit for their commercial
activities and for the expropriation of Mr. Garb's property. 5 Were
these events to occur today, foreign sovereign immunity would not
be available. The court, however, observed that Mr. Garb was
barred from bringing suit because retroactive application of the
FSIA would change prior law and thus alter Poland's expectations
of immunity. Therefore, the FSIA could not be applied
retroactively in his case. 6
The issue of retroactivity acted as a barrier to obtaining
jurisdiction in Garb. This case, however, is inconsistent with
decisions from various courts (including the United States
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and the Ninth Circuit) that addressed the issue of retroactivity and
removed it as a barrier to obtaining jurisdiction.17 From these
decisions, two different approaches to retroactive application of
the FSIA emerged. Some courts treat the FSIA as an intervening
procedural statute which merely confers jurisdiction and does not
interrupt a party's substantive rights. Other courts have found that
based on customary international law (such as jus cogens or
peremptory norms), application of the FSIA to pre-enactment
events would not "impair rights a party possessed when he
acted."'" When reviewed together, however, these decisions reveal
that the FSIA may be applied retroactively without adversely
affecting a party's settled expectations of immunity.
14. Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (citing Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1988)). In 1952, the State Department announced that
the United States would only recognize immunity in cases based on a foreign state's public
acts. After this formal adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, foreign
sovereigns no longer had an expectation of immunity and the FSIA could be applied to
events after this date. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6611.
15. Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
16. Id. at 27.
17. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 245 (1994); Princz v. Fed.
Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of the State
of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1999): Haven v. Republic of Poland, 68 F. Supp. 2d
943 (N.D. Ill. 1999): Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 175 F.
Supp. 2d 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Altman v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
2002).
18. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
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This Comment analyzes both approaches and argues that the
FSIA should apply retroactively to pre-1952 acts that violate
customary international law because foreign states did not have
settled expectations of immunity for these acts. This Comment,
however, does not assert that a foreign sovereign impliedly waives
their sovereign immunity by violating a jus cogens norm of
international law. Rather this Comment focuses on the sovereign's
settled expectations prior to the formal adoption of the restrictive
principle of sovereign immunity.
Part II discusses the history of sovereign immunity and
customary international law. Part III examines the effect and
operation of the FSIA on retroactive law. Part IV focuses on how
courts have treated the issue of retroactivity after the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products.'9
Part V applies the analysis garnered from these decisions and
examines how jus cogens norms are used to confer jurisdiction.
Finally, Part VI concludes that jus cogens norms of international
law, where established, may be used to defeat the presumption
against retroactive application of the FSIA.
II. BACKGROUND: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW &
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The law of sovereign immunity rests on the concept that "a
state's consent to suit is a necessary prerequisite to another state's
exercise of jurisdiction."2' Consent to suit is not required, however,
where there is a violation of jus cogens or peremptory norms of
international law. A jus cogens norm "is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character."'" There is general agreement that
certain human rights law, such as the prohibitions of slavery,
murder, genocide, torture, systematic racial discrimination, and
22prolonged arbitrary detention, has achieved jus cogens status.
19. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 244.
20. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1181.
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
287, 332, [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k, n. 6 (1987) (adopting Vienna Convention's definition of
jus cogens).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. n (1987).
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As a select and narrow subset of the norms recognized as
customary international law, 23 jus cogens norms "enjoy the highest
status in international law and prevail over both customary
international law and treaties., 24 Because jus cogens norms are
binding on all nations, without the need for treaty,25 they carry
significant implications for the law of sovereign immunity.
To understand the relationship between jus cogens and the
law of foreign sovereign immunity, it is useful to examine the
development of the immunity doctrine." Before 1952, foreign
sovereigns were entitled to assert absolute immunity from suit in
the United States Courts.27  Following the State Department's
adoption of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity in
1952, immunity was only confined to suits involving the foreign
sovereign's public acts. 8 This theory was codified in 1976 when
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.29 This Act
has been applicable to claims arising both before and after the
State Department's formal adoption of restrictive immunity in
1952.30 The inconsistent application of the Act is central in the
Garb court's retroactivity analysis.3 The following background
will attempt to clarify some of the prevailing issues.
A. Absolute Immunity
While Article III of the Constitution expressly includes suits
against "foreign states" within the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal courts, prior to 1952, the United States generally granted
foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit under the
23. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law defines customary
international law as the "general and consistent practice of the states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 102(2) (1987).
24. United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
25. See Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 53.
26. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166,1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
27. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16,21 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
28. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611.
29. Id. at 7.
30. See cases cited supra note 17.
31. See Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 25-30.
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ...
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, Citizens or subjects.").
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doctrine of "absolute sovereign immunity."33  The doctrine is a
product of judicial reluctance to interfere with foreign affairs
matters.34 According to the court in Garb, "The doctrine of
absolute immunity originated in an era of personal sovereignty
when the assertion of jurisdiction by one sovereign over another
was thought to constitute an affront to the latter's dignity and
independence."35
The United States Supreme Court first embraced the concept
of absolute immunity in 1812 in The Schooner Exchange v.
36M'Faddon. The court held that, absent consent, a foreign state is
entitled to absolute sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts." Chief Justice Marshall believed the world was
"composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and
equal independence ... ,,38 As such, foreign states enjoyed full
and absolute jurisdiction within their own territories.3 9
In addition to formally adopting the theory of absolute
immunity, Chief Justice Marshall also embraced the "implied
license" theory of immunity. Under this theory, a sovereign enters
the territory of a friendly foreign government "in the confidence
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by
implication, and will be extended to him.,
40
A foreign sovereign could waive immunity only where it
brought suit in the United States or took some other action related
to the conduct of litigation that manifested an intention to waive
33. Michael E. Jansen, FSIA Retroactivity Subsequent to the Issuance of the Tate
Letter: A proposed Solution to the Confusion, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 333, 345 (1989).
34. Brian S. Fraser, Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign
Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722, 723 (1983)
(comparing the act of state doctrine to doctrine of sovereign immunity).
35. Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2nd at 21.
36. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812)
(district court lacked jurisdiction over an armed French vessel which was within the
territory of the United States).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 136.
39. Michael W. Hoops, Comment, Retroactivity, Implied Waiver, and the FSIA: Is it
Time to Reform the Law on Sovereign Immunity?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 515, 519 (1995);
see also Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571-74 (1926) (Schooner Exchange
regarded as extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns, despite narrow
holding).
40. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 136.
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immunity.4' Moreover, the Supreme Court viewed the doctrine of
immunity as a matter that should be deferred to the executive
branch and routinely protected foreign states from suit consistent
with the executive branch policies.42
B. Transition from Absolute to Restrictive Immunity
The doctrine of absolute immunity began to lose momentum
long before the enactment of the FSIA. It was evident that the
absolute view of sovereign immunity produced hardships for U.S.
citizens involved in contracts with foreign entities or suffering torts
committed by foreign entities because they had no opportunity for
legal redress in U.S. courts. 3
By the mid-1940's, the doctrine began to give way to
restrictive immunity as the U.S. judiciary adopted a new approach,
by deferring to practices and policies of the U.S. Department of
State only on a case-by-case basis rather than presumptively
following them."
In 1952, the theory of absolute sovereign immunity was
formally replaced by the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity
in the landmark letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor,
Department of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B.
41. See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Wald, J., dissenting); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617 (illustrations of implied waiver exception).
42. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) ("Until
1952, the State Department ordinarily requested immunity in all actions against friendly
foreign sovereigns."); see also Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943) (Court
deferred to State Department's formal recognition of the Peruvian government's claim
that a merchant vessel owned and operated by it was immune from jurisdiction); Puente v.
British Ministry of War Transp., 116 F.2d 43 (1940) (Spanish government held immune
upon suggestion of Spanish Ambassador); Piascik v. British Ministry of War Transp., 54 F.
Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, and holding
that British Ministry of War Transport was immune upon suggestion of Secretary of
State).
43. Sandra Engle, Choosing Law for Attributing Liability Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Proposal for Uniformity, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1060, 1063
(1992).
44. Id. at 1063; see also Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Compania
Espanola De Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2nd Cir. 1964); Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (Court subjected Merchant vessel owned by Mexican
government but not its possession or control to jurisdiction of district courts because the
State Department took no position with respect to the vessel's asserted immunity).
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Perlman ("Tate Letter"). 45 Under the restrictive theory, the State
Department would no longer assert immunity on behalf of friendly
foreign sovereigns in suits arising from private or commercial
activity.46 Immunity was confined to the sovereign or public acts of
the foreign state and did not extend to its commercial or private
acts.47 Thereafter, this restrictive theory became the prevailing law
in the United States.48  This new policy provided assurance for
those engaging in transactions with foreign sovereigns that their
rights would be enforced in the courts whenever possible.49
C. Codification of Restrictive Immunity-FSIA
Despite its overwhelming approval, the State Department's
new policy did not provide courts with concrete standards for
determining whether to assert jurisdiction over suits against
foreign states. As a result, numerous problems began to emerge
with regard to application and implementation of the new theory.0
Specifically, decisions regarding immunity were often arbitrary
and inconsistent because they were based on politics or current
foreign relation policies that were constantly shifting." Courts
45. Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to
Foreign Governments, May 19, 1952, U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL. vol. XXVI, no. 678, June 23,
1952 at 984 [hereinafter Tate Letter]. Tate cited the following reasons for adoption of the
theory: (i) most civil law countries had already adopted it; (ii) the Government of the
United States did not claim immunity when sued in foreign courts in contract or tort; and
(iii) the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in
commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business
with them to have their rights determined in the courts. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Jansen, supra note 33, at 346.
49. See Tate Letter, supra note 45 ("[t]he widespread and increasing practice on the
part of the governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice
which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the
courts.").
50. Jansen, supra note 33, at 346.
51. Id. at 347 (citing Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th
Cir. 1986)). The court summarized the problems emerging from the Tate Letter as follows:
After the Tate Letter the executive, acting through the State Department,
usually would make "suggestions" on whether sovereign immunity should be
recognized by a court, and courts generally abided [by] these suggestions. This
proved troublesome, because foreign nations at times placed diplomatic pressure
on the State Department, and political considerations led to suggestions of
immunity where it was not available under the restrictive theory .... Moreover,
foreign nations did not always make requests to the State Department, and
responsibility fell to the courts to determine whether sovereign immunity
2003] Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
were also unable to distinguish between public and private acts
because there was no clear, established method," and there was no
clear way to secure in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state 3
In 1976, with the passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, Congress provided such standards. The FSIA
codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and
conferred on United States Courts subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against foreign sovereigns.* According to the Department
of State, the purpose of the legislation "was to facilitate and
depoliticize litigation against foreign states and to minimize
irritations in foreign relations arising out of such litigation . . . ."
The executive branch was persuaded to codify the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity after discovering that almost every
country in Western Europe followed the restrictive principle and
U.S. pleas of immunity were "routinely denied in tort and contract
cases where the necessary contacts with forum were present.
'5 6
Following codification, the FSIA has had a significant impact on
international practice. The United Kingdom57 and Canada 8 have
enacted statutes which apply the same basic principles as the
existed. With two different branches involved the governing standards were
neither clear nor uniform. Id.
52. Id. at 357 n.95 ("Courts and commentators formulated several tests to distinguish
between commercial and governmental acts. Some tests focused on the 'nature' of the act,
classifying as sovereign those acts which could only be performed by the sovereign,
whereas others preferred the "purpose" test, under which an act would be considered
sovereign if performed for a public purpose.").
53. Id. at 348; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8-9 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611 (describes difficulties arising from the Tate Letter from a legal
standpoint, foreign relations standpoint, and the standpoint of a private litigant).
54. Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423,
428 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("The relevant jurisdictional language appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)
which provides that: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.").
55. Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State and Harold R. Tyler
Jr., Deputy Attorney General to Carl 0. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives
(October 31, 1975) in H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 44-46 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6634-35.
56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6611.
57. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 1 (Eng.).
58. State Immunity Act, 1982, ch. 95, 1980-83 S.C. 2949 (Can.).
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FSIA. 9 These principals are generally accepted as consistent with
international law and practice.
III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FSIA DOES NOT
ADVERSELY AFFECT ANTECEDENT RIGHTS
After 1952, a foreign sovereign could anticipate being sued in
the U.S. courts for commercial transactions or private acts. In the
interest of protecting the antecedent rights of foreign sovereigns,
the FSIA was not applied retroactively to transactions which took
place prior to the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereignty.
The following analysis of the effect and operation of retroactive
law reveals that the FSIA may be applied retroactively without
61adversely affecting the antecedent rights of parties.
A. Definition and Interpretation of Retroactive Law
A retroactive or "retrospective" statute is defined as "one
which gives to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from
that which it would have had without the passage of the statute.,
62
The term also refers to laws which take away, impair, or change
rights acquired under existing laws with respect to transactions
63already past. In general, while statutes are presumed to operate
prospectively only,64 curative statutes may apply retroactively in
order to "clarify" existing law or cure a defect in prior legislation.65
Where statutes do not specify their temporal reach, courts
generally apply two rules. According to the Supreme Court in
Bradley v. School Rd. of Richmond,66 the court should apply "the
59. For detailed discussion of the case law addressing sovereign immunity in these
and other countries see "X" v. Kaiserreich Iran, 45 I.L.R. 57 (B VerfGE 1963).
60. Mark B. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19,24 (1986).
61. 45 AM. JR. 2D International Law § 86 (2002).
62. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 71 HARV. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960).
63. BLACKS LAW DICrIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990); see also Sturges v. Carter, 114
U.S. 511, 519 (1885).
64. Debra L. Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative
Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 466 n.63 (2001).
65. Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81,
95 (1997).
66. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (a statute authorizing the
award of attorney's fees to successful civil rights plaintiffs applied in a case that was
pending on appeal at the time the statute was enacted).
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law in effect at the time it renders its decision." 67  In Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, the Supreme Court further
explains that "congressional enactments and administrative rules
will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their
language requires this result. '
The text of the FSIA does not express a clear congressional
intent that the statute be applied retroactively. This creates tension
between the two rules because without express language of
congressional intent, retroactive application of the FSIA is not
possible according to Bowen; yet according to Bradley the statute
may be applied retroactively. This tension acutely manifests itself
in a court's interpretation of the FSIA. The following analysis of
case precedent reveals how various courts have diverged in their
application of the FSIA to pre-1952 events.
B. Statutory Interpretation of the FSIA 1984-1994
In the 1980's, circuit courts in Jackson v. Republic of China,
Slade v. United States of Mexico and Carl Marks & Co., were
unwilling to give retroactive effect to the FSIA without
"unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest
intention of the legislature," and therefore denied subject matter.... 69
jurisdiction. Thus "the FSIA would properly apply to events
occurring after the issuance of the 1952 Tate Letter."70
Consequently, other circuit courts simply deferred to Jackson,
67. Id. at 711.
68. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (holding that the
Department of Health and Human Services lacked statutory authority to promulgate a
rule requiring private hospitals to refund Medicare payments for services rendered before
promulgation of the rule).
69. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards, 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913); see also
Jackson v. Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986); Slade v. United States of
Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351 (D.C.D.C. 1985), affid mem., 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Carl
Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1988).
70. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2002); see Carl Marks
& Co., 841 F.2d at 27 ("We believe, as did the district court, that only after 1952 was it
reasonable for a foreign sovereign to anticipate being sued in the United States courts on
commercial transactions."); Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1497-98 ("We agree that to give the Act
retrospective application to pre-1952 events would interfere with antecedent rights of
other sovereigns (and also with antecedent principles of law that the United States
followed until 1952)."); Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 356 ("[T]he Court finds that the FSIA
cannot be applied retroactively to this case where all the operative events occurred before
1952.").
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Slade, and Marks and refused to apply the FSIA to pre-1952
events.7'
In 1994, however, the United States Supreme Court diverged
from the course charted by the circuit courts and began to
reconsider the issue of retroactivity under a different guise. The
Court, in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, held that a statute which
confers jurisdiction may be applied retroactively where it does not
interfere with a party's substantive rights.
Specifically, the Court considered whether the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 could apply retroactively.72 In deciding this issue, the
Court delivered a new pronouncement on the retroactivity of
jurisdictional statutes: A statute "does not operate
'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from
conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations
based in prior law. " Rather, the court must ask whether the new
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment.
74
Landgraf set out a two-part test for initial retroactivity
analysis. The first step is to determine if Congress has expressly
stated whether the statute applies retroactively or prospectively.
If Congress has prescribed the statute's reach, judicial default rules
are unnecessary.76 If Congress has not provided express direction,
the second step is to determine "whether the new statute would
have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past
71. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Sampson v.
Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001).
72. Laitos, supra note 65, at 90.
73. Id. at 90 n.26. In 1989 the plaintiff in Landgraf brought suit against her employer
for allegedly violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 248 (1994). Her complaint was dismissed because she was not
entitled to the equitable relief permitted by Title VII, which at that time did not authorize
the recovery of damages. Id. at 249. While her appeal was pending, the 1991 Act
permitting the recovery of damages was signed into law. Id. The question before the
Supreme Court in Landgraf was whether the compensatory and punitive damage
provision of § 102 of the 1991 Act should apply, post-enactment, to conduct that occurred
before the effective date of the 1991 Act. Id. at 250.
74. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70.
75. Id. at 280.
76. Id.
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conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed."
77
This initial two-part inquiry modified the assumption of
statutory prospectivity. The absence of express retroactive intent
does not necessarily prevent the court from applying a statutory
provision retroactively."8 The Court explained, "While we have
strictly construed the Ex Post Facto Clause to prohibit application
of new statutes creating or increasing punishments after the fact,
we have upheld intervening procedural changes even if application
of the new rule operated to a defendant's disadvantage in the
particular case."'79
The Court noted jurisdictional and procedural rules may
apply retroactively without an express congressional command
because they regulate 'secondary' rather than 'primary' conduct."'
Accordingly, treating the FSIA as a jurisdictional statute
regulating secondary conduct "takes away no substantive right but
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.'8 In such
situations, the Court found that "present law normally governs."'82
While the Court's willingness to justify the retroactive
application of jurisdictional statutes raised important concerns83
for latter courts attempting to apply the Landgraf test to FSIA
cases, it established a foundation for retroactive effect of the
FSIA.
77. Id.
78. Bassett, supra note 64, at 492.
79. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 n.28.
80. Id. at 274-75 ("Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary
conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to
the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive."); see also Laitos, supra
note 65, at 87 ("Primary retroactivity alters the legal consequences of past private action,
while secondary retroactivity affects the legality of past private action in the future, after
the applicable date of the law.").
81. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508
(1916)).
82. Id.
83. The absence of a clear boundary between substance and procedure within the
FSIA raised concerns that retroactive application of the FSIA may interfere with a party's
substantive rights. In addition, there were concerns that Landgraf essentially ignores the
presumption against retroactivity. For discussion of these concerns see Landgraf, 511 U.S.
at 264-65 (Scalia, J. concurring); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. 520 U.S. 939,
951 (1997); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle
of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936); Jansen, supra note 33, at 338.
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IV. POST LANDGRAF JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH TO
RETROACTIVITY
Landgraf v. USI Film Products laid an important foundation
for retroactivity jurisprudence that followed. While many courts
have rejected the Landgraf approach, others have relied on the
jurisdictional retroactivity passage to justify holding that the FSIA,
as a jurisdictional statute, is to be applied retroactively to pre-1952
events. 84 In addition, courts began to apply the second prong of
the Landgraf test to examine whether retroactive application of
the FSIA would interfere with the sovereign's settled expectations
of immunity. In doing so, customary international law becomes a
crucial factor in the court's retroactivity analysis. This new
emphasis on custom and peremptory norms raises doubts against
the presumption of non-retroactivity.
A. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany
A few months after the Supreme Court's holding in Landgraf,
the D.C. Circuit Court addressed the issue of retroactive
application of the FSIA. In Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, an American citizen who survived the Holocaust sued
the Federal Republic of Germany, seeking "to recover money
damages for injuries he suffered and slave labor he performed
while prisoner in Nazi concentration camps." 6 The district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it
found that none of the FSIA statutory exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity applied.87 In reaching this decision, the district
court dodged the issue of whether FSIA applies to pre-1952
events.
84. See Creighton Ltd, v. Gov't of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
Haven v. Republic of Poland, 68 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. 111. 1999); Altmann v. Republic of
Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
85. Id.
86. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1168.
87. Id. at 1171. The commercial activity exception, the waiver exception, and the
treaty provision were all rejected by the district court. The court also concluded that there
was no jurisdiction because Mr. Princz's claims arise in tort and quasi contract. A court
cannot revive the pre-FSIA jurisdiction of § 1332 over cases brought by a United States
Citizen against a foreign state. Id.
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With respect to retroactivity, the district court merely
reviewed the purpose of the FSIA8 and analyzed a deletedS• 89
provision from 28 U.S.C. § 1332 for diversity jurisdiction suits
brought by a United States citizen against a foreign government.
From this brief analysis, the court found that "a strong argument
in favor of applying the FSIA retroactively existed." 9
The district court postulated that application of the FSIA to
acts committed before 1952 would not be retroactive because it
"would not alter Germany's liability under the applicable
substantive law in force at the time, i.e, it would just remove the
bar of sovereign immunity to the plaintiff's vindicating his rights
under that law."'91 Thus, if the FSIA did apply in this case, "the
FSIA is to be applied to all cases decided after its enactment, i.e.
regardless of when the plaintiff's cause of action may have
accrued., 92 The court added, "[the] application of the FSIA to the
pre-1952 events here in suit may not even count as 'a genuinely
'retroactive' effect.' ' 93
Despite the majority's refusal to determinatively address the
issue, Judge Wald for the dissent argued for a definite decision on
the retroactive issue and found that the implied waiver exception 9
4
should apply to claims against Germany by a Holocaust survivor
under the theory that all nations are understood to have consented
to suits for violations of jus cogens norms. 95 She concluded that,
[11n the absence of any indication that Congress intended to
exclude from the scope of 1605(a)(1) the concept that a foreign
state waives its immunity by breaching a peremptory norm of
international law, I believe that the only way to interpret the
FSIA in accordance with international law is to construe the
88. Id. ("In declaring the purpose of the FSIA, the Congress directed that '[c]laims of
foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States
and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter."').
89. Id. According to the House Report on the FSIA, "since jurisdiction in actions
against foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new section 1330, a similar
jurisdictional basis under section 1332 becomes superfluous." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 14
(1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611.
90. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1170.
93. Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
94. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(1) (Law Co-op. 2002) ("A foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of courts in the United States . . . in which the foreign state has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication..
95. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1179 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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Act to encompass an implied waiver exception for jus cogens
violations. Congress did not intend to thwart the opportunity of
an American victim of the Holocaust to have his claims heard
by the United States judicial system.96
Judge Wald's view was rejected by the Princz majority. Then-
Judge Ginsburg writing for the court, found that the "jus cogens
theory of implied waiver is incompatible with the intentionality
requirement implicit in § 1605(a)(1)." 97 That requirement is
reflected in the examples of implied waiver set forth in the
legislative history of § 1605(a)(1). The House Report notes that
implied waiver may be found when a foreign sovereign either:
agrees to arbitrate in another country, agrees that the law of
another country governs a particular contract, or fails to raise the
defense of sovereign immunity in its responsive pleadings.9
According to Judge Ginsburg, "since the FSIA became law, courts
have been reluctant to stray beyond these examples when
considering claims that a nation has implicitly waived its defense of
sovereign immunity." 99 The court is concerned that "[s]uch an
expansive reading of § 1605(a)(1) would likely place an enormous
strain not only upon our courts but, more to the immediate point,
upon our country's diplomatic relations with any number of
foreign nations.
While the majority quickly rejected Judge Wald's implied
waiver argument, Judge Wald's dissenting opinion raises
significant considerations for immunity and retroactivity analysis.
Specifically, it demonstrates that following Landgraf, the court, or
at least certain members, were beginning to recognize that the
existence of certain jus cogens norms should be taken into
consideration when analyzing a foreign sovereign's assertion that it
is immune from suit based on their settled expectation of
immunity prior to 1952.
96. Id. at 1184-85.
97. Id. 1174.
98. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 18, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6616-6617.
99. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 18, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6616-6617.
100. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174 n.1.
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B. The aftermath of Princz: Creighton Limited v. Government of
the State of Qatar & Haven v. Republic of Poland
The district court was next called upon to address the issue of
retroactivity in Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of
Qatar.'O' At this point, the court was still reluctant to conduct a jus
cogens analysis. Rather, the court merely applied the Landgraf
jurisdictional approach and found that the FSIA could be
retroactively applied to pre-enactment conduct.
In Creighton, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decided the effect of a 1988 arbitration exception'0 2 to the FSIA.
The question was whether the 1988 enactment was applicable in a
situation where the arbitration agreement had antedated that
enactment.'13 The appeals court held that the 1988 arbitration
exception to FSIA conferred subject matter jurisdiction over this
case and was not impermissibly retroactive.1(4 The arbitration
amendment "[spoke] not to the primary conduct of the parties but
rather ... as specifying a forum for adjudication of that primary
conduct."10 5 Application of the exception, therefore, "does] not
affect the contractual right of the parties to arbitration." (°6 The
court, however, dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction
over Qatar.'0 7
The Creighton decision is nevertheless significant because
contrary to the decisions in Jackson and Carl Marks & Co., it
initiated the view that Congress conferred jurisdiction over claims
arising before 1952 in enacting the FSIA.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
Haven v. Republic of Poland supported the Creighton view.' °8 In
101. 181F.3d 118.
102. See U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. 2002) ("A foreign state shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the States in any case
•.. in which the action is brought ... or to confirm an award made pursuant to ... an
agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to place in the
United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to
arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court under this section ... .
103. Creighton, 181 F.3d at 124.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 128.
108. 68 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. I11. 1999).
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Haven, plaintiffs brought suit against Poland for the seizure and
expropriation of their real property during World War 1.19 The
district court denied the Republic of Poland's motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the FSIA could
be retroactively applied. In conducting its analysis, the court
distinguished Carl Marks, Jackson, and Creighton. The basis for
the decisions in Carl Marks and Jackson were not jurisdictional in
the Landgraf sense, "that is, whether the Act applies to conduct
that predated its grant of subject matter jurisdiction," but rather
"how far back the conduct susceptible to relief should go once
such jurisdiction has been conferred.'1 . The court then concluded
that although the question was close, "the District of Columbia
view .. . [was] more persuasive.' ' 12 Accordingly, the court found
that the FSIA conferred subject matter jurisdiction over the
Republic of Poland.
Despite the growing support for retroactive application of the
FSIA, not all courts were ready to completely accept this view."3
The Garb court, for example, specifically rejected the Landgraf
jurisdiction approach. "Nothing in the Court's decision in
Landgraf," the court noted, "overruled the Second Circuit's ruling
in Carl Marks that a foreign state's settled expectations of
immunity from the jurisdiction of the United States courts 'rises to
the level of an antecedent right.""' 4 Relying on Hughes Aircraft
and Verlinden, the Garb court determined that "sovereign
immunity is an issue of substantive, not merely jurisdictional
law. ," 5
109. Id. at 944.
110. Id. at 946.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 175 F. Supp. 2d
423, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over claims of
Holocaust survivors against French railroad company for violations of customary
international law in connection with deportation of Jews from France to various Nazi
death camps during World War II). Id. at 425.
114. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Carl
Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2d Cir.
1988)).
115. Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 30; see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S.
939, 950-951 (1997); Verlinden B.C. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1983)
("The [FSIA] does not merely concern access to the federal courts. Rather, it governs the
type of actions for which foreign sovereigns may be held liable in a court in the United
States, federal or state. The Act codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign
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The Garb court, however, did not apply the second step of the
Landgraf analysis to determine whether application of the FSIA
would have "a genuinely retroactive effect" by impairing a party's
settled expectations of immunity.'16 Rather, the court relied on the
1952 Tate Letter as its imaginary boundary for conferring absolute
immunity. In doing so, the Garb court failed to take into
consideration the existence of established norms of customary
international law and easily dismissed the argument raised by the
dissent in Princz that the violation of jus cogens by the Third
Reich constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign immunity under
the FSIA."7 Following Garb, however, courts began to take the
existence of jus cogens norms more seriously.
C. Altmann v. Republic of Austria: Customary International Law
Approach to Immunity.
The arguments for retroactive application of the FSIA to pre-
1952 events raised in Princz influenced the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit to grant jurisdiction in Altmann v. Republic of
Austria."" In Altmann, a U.S. citizen sued the Republic of Austria
to recover six Gustav Klimt paintings that were allegedly stolen by
the Nazis in the 1940's with Austria's assistance. n9 In determining
whether the district court properly held that the FSIA may be
applied to the alleged wrongful appropriation by the Republic, the
appeals court examined the issue of retroactivity from a historical
perspective and applied the Landgraf test to conduct its analysis.
The court was also persuaded by the reasoning set forth by Judge
Wald in her dissenting opinion in Princz"2
immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law .... ; and applying those standards will
generally require interpretation of numerous points of federal law.").
116. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 277 (1994).
117. See Garb, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 38-39; Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250
F.3d 1145, 1156 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Congress did not create an [implied waiver] exception to
foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA for violations of jus cogens."); Siderman de
Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that there has been a
violation of jus cogens does not confer jurisdiction under the FSIA."); Smith v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Our rejection of the
claim that a jus cogens violation constitutes an implied waiver within the meaning of the
FSIA rests neither on reading a subjective "intentionality" requirement into section
1605(a)(1), nor on the precedent of Amerada Hess.").
118. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2002).
119. Id. at 974.
120. Id. at 962-63; see Princz, 26 F.3d at 1178-79 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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Accordingly, rather than analyzing congressional intent, the
court turned to the second prong of the Landgraf test and
examined "whether applying the FSIA would 'impair rights a party
possessed when he acted.' 12' To determine Austria's legitimate
expectations during this period, the court looked at the practice of
American courts at the time. 22 During the period when the
paintings were allegedly seized, the courts employed the practice
of "judicial deference 'to the case-by-case foreign policy
determinations of the executive branch."" As explained in Part
II above, "[u]ntil 1952, the State Department ordinarily requested
immunity in all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns."'' 24
During the period following World War II, however, the court
reasoned "Austrians could not have had any expectation, much
less a settled expectation, that the State Department would have
recommended immunity as a matter of 'grace and comity' for the
wrongful appropriation of Jewish property."'
' 25
In reaching this conclusion the court examined Austria's
obligations under the Hague Convention and their actions taken
after 1946. The court explained, "Austria was mindful that
[discriminatory expropriation of Jewish property] explicitly
violated both Austria's and Germany's obligations under the
Hague Convention ... and that Austria's Second Republic
officially repudiated all Nazi transactions in 1946 .... ,126
To support the argument that the State Department would
not have recommended immunity to Austria prior to 1952, the
court points to an April 13, 1949 letter from State Department
Legal Advisor, Jack B. Tate announcing the State Department's
adoption of a policy to remove obstacles to recovery specifically
for victims of Nazi expropriations. 2 7  The court summarized a
press release, which published the letter:
121. Altmann, 317 F.3d at 964 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)).
124. Id. (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486) (emphasis added).
125. ld. at 965.
126. Id.; see Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907,1907 U.S.T. 29 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
127. Altmann, 317 F.3d at 965-66 (referring to Press Release No. 296, United States
State Department, Jurisdiction of United States Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property
Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers (Apr. 27, 1945), reprinted in Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir.1954) [hereinafter Press Release
No. 296]).
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The letter repeats this Government's opposition to forcible acts
of dispossession of a discriminatory and confiscatory nature
practiced by the Germans on the countries or peoples subject to
their controls; states that it is this Government's policy to undo
the forced transfers and restitute identifiable property to the
victims of the Nazi persecution wrongfully deprived of such
property; and sets forth that the policy of the Executive, with
respect to claims asserted in the United States for restitution of
such property, is to relieve American courts from any restraint
upon the exercise of their urisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the acts of Nazi officials.
Judge Wardlaw, quoting Judge Wald's dissent in Princz also
notes that the "1945-46 Nuremberg trials signaled that the
international community, and particularly the United States ...
would not have supported a broad enough immunity to shroud the
atrocities committed during the Holocaust."' l 9 Thus Austria could
have had no reasonable expectation of immunity in a foreign
court.
The appeals court offers three additional reasons for
defeating Austria's argument that the FSIA infringes on their
rights held at the time the acts at issue occurred. First, Austria had
adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by the 1920s,
over thirty years before the issuance of the 1952 Tate Letter.3 ' For
support, the court points to the Tate letter itself, which made
reference to the fact that the courts of Austria already supported
the restrictive theory.131
Secondly, the court reasoned the FSIA is applicable in this
case, "[b]ecause a United States court would apply the
international law of takings, which presumably would be applied in
any foreign court."' 32 Therefore, "the application of the FSIA to
the facts of this case 'merely address[es] which court shall have
jurisdiction' and thus 'can fairly be said merely to regulate the
secondary conduct of litigation and not the underlying primary
conduct of the parties. ' , 13 3 Such an application of the FSIA would
128. Id. at 965-66 (quoting Press Release No. 296, supra note 127 (emphasis added)).
129. Id. at 966 (quoting Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1179 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)).
130. Id. at 954, 966.
131. Id. at 966 (quoting The Tate Letter, supra note 45).
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939,
951 (1997) (emphasis in original)).
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not be impermissibly retroactive because it "affect[s] only where a
suit may be brought, not whether it may be brought at all ....
Finally, the court distinguished from Altmann earlier cases
holding the FSIA inapplicable to pre-1952 events. According to
the court, the earlier cases "involve economic transactions entered
into long before . . . and prior to the defendant country's
acceptance of the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity.'
135
The disputes in Carl Marks, Jackson, and Slade, unlike the
international takings claim asserted in Altmann, "essentially
involved contracts, an area in which courts have traditionally
deferred to the 'settled expectations' of the parties at the time of
contracting in recognition of the parties' allocation of risk.' 3 6 The
court explains, "such deference is especially due in financial
transactions involving foreign debt instruments, where unexpected
judicial intrusion essentially would re-write the parties' original
bargain."'37 Such a presumption of deference does not apply in
Altmann because it is inapplicable in an international takings
claim .13 For these reasons, the court held that the FSIA may be
applied retroactively to the pre-1952 actions of the Republic of
Austria.39
V. EXPECTATIONS OF IMMUNITY & CIL
The arguments put forth by the dissent in Princz and
eventually adopted by the court in Altmann signal an important
change in the court's retroactivity jurisprudence. Examining jus
cogens norms of international law in conjunction with the practices
of the executive and judiciary during the period preceding the
formal adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in
1952 effectively challenges the presumption against retroactive
application of the FSIA. The proceeding analysis examines the
various arguments raised by the post-Landgraf cases.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 967.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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A. The Expectation of Immunity Dismantled
Many courts, including the Garb court, are reluctant to
disrupt a foreign sovereign's settled expectations of immunity. As
a result they subject the FSIA to the traditional presumption
against retroactivity. This fear of potential unfairness, however, is
inconsistent with the notion that, "[t]he immunity of a foreign state
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts was never considered to be a
right per se, but rather, a matter of comity and grace.'
40
Although the Tate Letter is formally recognized as the
moment when the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was
formally adopted, there is evidence that this position began to
change years earlier. During the period before World War II,
the practice of the executive branch was to make immunity
determinations on a case-by-case foreign policy basis.
4 2
Therefore, "[a]ny 'right' to sovereign immunity that a foreign state
possessed under pre-FSIA law was, in reality, nothing more than
an expectation."4  Thus, although states may have hoped to
receive complete sovereign immunity, there was expectation that
they may be sued in some situations.
B. The Elusive Jus Cogens Norm
The question then becomes whether the executive branch
would have recommended immunity for perpetrators of jus cogens
norms. Certain historical events shed light on the early
recognition of such a nonderogable principle of customary
international law. The following analysis of the Hague
Convention and the Nuremberg trials provide evidence that many
grappled with the issue of immunity prior to the United States'
formal adoption of restrictive theory in 1952.
To ascertain whether accepted norms of customary
international law, such as the denunciation of genocide and
slavery, are considered jus cogens norms, "[j]udges resort to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these,
140. Hoops, supra note 39, at 533.
141. E.g., Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies, 67
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 581, 583-84 (1993). Judge Re, Chief Judge Emeritus of the Court of
International Trade, observed that it was announced in 1948 that the State Department
was reconsidering its policy on absolute immunity. Id.
142. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
143. Hoops, supra note 39, at 533.
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to the works of jurists and commentators.",144  The existence,
however, of an international consensus endorsing the existence
and force of jus cogens norms for human rights violations prior to
the Nuremberg trials is difficult to ascertain. As Judge Ginsburg
explained in Princz, "[b]efore the Nuremberg trials, such outrages
had not been expressly declared violations of the law of nations.' 45
As early as 1907, certain acts were explicitly prohibited and
recognized by international treaty. The Hague Convention (IV) on
the Laws and Customs of War on Land explicitly prohibited
discriminatory expropriation and other crimes which were later
recognized in the Nuremberg and United Nations Charters as
"crimes against humanity.' ' 146
While it remained unclear whether certain acts had achieved
jus cogens status as a result of this treaty, the Nuremberg Tribunal
confronted this issue and nonetheless punished Nazi officials for
committing crimes against humanity. As Judge Wald explains,
they reasoned that "[t]he magnitude of the acts put the
perpetrators on notice that they were violating 'principles common
to the major legal systems of the world." Therefore, "the
possibility of punishment should have been so apparent to the
criminals that no one, except a strict formalist, could seriously
raise the issue of ex post facto punishment.'
' 4
Following the Nuremberg trials, it was made explicit what was
theretofore, "implicit in International Law, namely, that ... to
persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on
political, racial, or religious grounds ... , or to exterminate,
144. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
145. Id. at 1173 (referring to David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the
Customary Internal Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332,
340 (1988)).
146. Hague Convention (IV) on the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
1907 U.S.T. 29 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910); London Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, pt. 11, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547. (The
definition of crimes against humanity included "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before, or
during the war.")
147. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Report to the President from Robert H. Jackson,
Chief Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, reprinted in
39 AM. J. INT'L L. 178, 186 (Supp. 1945)).
148. Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 833, 844 (1990)(citing BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO
NUREMBERG 211 (1982)).
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enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an international
crime.
, 149
Courts have also acknowledged that certain jus cogens
principles existed prior to the Nuremberg trials. For example, the
Ninth Circuit explained in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, "that universal and fundamental rights of human beings
identified by Nuremberg - rights against genocide, enslavement,
and other inhumane acts ... - are the direct ancestors of the
universal and fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens.
150
Therefore, expectations of immunity for jus cogens violations prior
to 1952 may no longer be presumed.
C. International Exercise of Jurisdiction
The principle of universal jurisdiction is also employed by
foreign sovereigns to exercise jurisdiction where no other
recognized basis for jurisdiction exists . Under the principle of
universal jurisdiction,
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism, even where none of the basis of jurisdiction
152indicated in section 402 is present.
This principle has been applied by various foreign states to
prosecute foreign individuals and governments for human rights
atrocities. Israel, for example, prosecuted Adolf Eichman for his
role in organizing the "murder, extermination, enslavement,
starvation, and deportation of the civilian Jewish population"
149. Robert H. Jackson, Final Report to the President on the Nuremberg Trials, Oct. 7,
1946, U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL. vol. XV, nos. 366-391, Oct. 27, 1946, at 771, 774; see also
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/236
(1947). (After the Nuremberg War crimes trials, the General Assembly of the United
Nations unanimously approved a resolution affirming "the principles of international law
recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg [sic] Tribunal and the judgment of the
Tribunal.")
150. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715.
151. JEFFRY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 353 (Aspen Law
& Business 2002).
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
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during World War I.153 The court reasoned, "[I]t is the universal
character of the crimes in question which vests in every state the
power to try and punish those who participated in their
commission.,
5 1
In Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany,55 the
Hellenic Supreme Court of Greece denied immunity to Germany
for atrocities committed by the German Occupation forces of the
village of Distomo on June 10, 1944. The court concluded that the
acts committed by Germany were "in breach of the rules of
peremptory international law (Article 46 of the [Hague IV
Convention] Regulations), and they were not acts jure imperii.'
15 6
As a result, the Greek court found that Germany waived the
privilege of immunity which gave the court jurisdiction to
adjudicate the case."'
These cases reveal that, "it has become increasingly common
for courts to hold that the mere sovereign or public character of an
act is not sufficient to guarantee states immunity from the
jurisdiction of other states' courts."'58 This shift is illustrated in the
landmark ruling against President Pinochet of Chile where the
House of Lords gave consideration, to the nature of the violated
norm-in particular, if it constituted a peremptory norm of
international law, before holding that Pinochet was not entitled to
head of state immunity.159
VI. CONCLUSION
The only established sanctions for the breach of a jus cogens
rule at this time are Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention.' 60 Without more, the Garb court has a legitimate fear
153. Attorney-General of the State of Israel v. Adolf Eichman, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S.Ct.
1962).
154. Id. at 298.
155. Prefecture of Voitia v. Fed. Republic of Germany. Case No. 11/2000. Areios
Pagos (Hellenic Supreme Court), May 4, 2000 cited in Bernard Oxman & Maria
Gavouneli, Sovereign Immunity-Tort Exception-Jus Cogens Violations- World War II
Reparations -International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 198 (2001).
156. Oxman & Gavouneli, supra note 155, at 200.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 201.
159. Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex part Pinochet Ugarte (no. 3), 2
ALL E.R. 97 (1999) (Majority of House of Lords held that international crimes such as
torture cannot constitute official acts of a head of state).
160. Oxman & Gavouneli,supra note 155, at 203 (citing Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331) "A treaty is
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that retroactive application to pre-1952 events would open the
United States to a floodgate of litigation against other Eastern
European countries such as Hungary and Romania.1
6'
Complications may also interrupt treaties made between Poland
and the United States as well as remedies made available in
Poland. These concerns also influenced the majority in Princz.162
While the effect of retroactive application of the FSIA to pre-
1952 events will no doubt have a major impact on both United
States and international courts, the issue of settled expectations
deserves a closer examination. After examination of both the
statutory reach of the FSIA and customary international law, this
threshold question should be resolved. The court must then still
proceed with its analysis of whether any FSIA exceptions apply. It
is anything but an uphill battle as Hugo Princz, Theo Garb, and
Maria Altmann have shown us.
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rendered void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm either at the time of its conclusion or
as a result of the emergence of a new norm of that type. Another is arguably proposed in
the ILC Draft Articles, provided that the international "crime" articulated in Article 19 is
equated with ajus cogens rule." Id.
161. See Tom Perrotta, Holocaust Suit Against Poland Thrown Out, N.Y. L.J., June 25,
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court worried, "Such an expansive reading of 1605(a)(1) would likely place an enormous
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